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he European Union is a voluntary, quasi-federation of sovereign and democratic 
states  in  which  elections  matter  and  the  electorates  in  each  country  seek  to 
determine  their  own  destiny,  regardless  of  the  wishes  and  interests  of  their 
partner member states.  
Last October, Greece’s then-prime minister, George Papandreou, proposed a popular 
referendum on the second rescue package that had just been agreed at the EU’s summit 
in Brussels. He was quickly told off by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and former 
French  President  Nicolas  Sarkozy,  who  considered  the  referendum  (especially  its 
timetable) in breach of the agreement they had just concluded. So the Greeks never 
voted on it. 
But, less than a year later, the referendum is de facto taking place anyway. In a union of 
democracies, it is impossible to force sovereign countries to adhere to rules if their 
citizens no longer accept them. 
This reality has profound implications: all of those grandiose plans to create a political 
union to support the euro with a common fiscal policy cannot work as long as EU 
member  countries  remain  both  democratic  and  sovereign.  Governments  may  sign 
treaties and make solemn commitments to subordinate their fiscal policies to EU rules 
(or to be more precise, to the wishes of Germany and the European Central Bank). But, 
in the end, the “people” remain the real sovereign, and they can choose to ignore their 
governments’  promises  and  reject  any  adjustment  programme  emanating  from 
‘Brussels’. 
In contrast to the United States, the EU cannot send its marshals to enforce its pacts or 
collect debt. Any country can leave the EU, and thus the eurozone, when the perceived 
burden of its obligations becomes too onerous. Until now, it had been assumed that the 
cost of exit would be so high that it would never be considered. This is no longer true, 
at least for Greece. 
But, more broadly, EU commitments have now become relative to national priorities. 
This shift in context implies that jointly guaranteed Eurobonds cannot be the silver 
bullet  that  some  had  hoped  for.  As  long  as  member  states  remain  completely 
sovereign, no one can fully reassure investors that in the event of a major recession or a 
eurozone break-up, some states will not simply refuse to pay, or at least refuse to pay 
for the others. In the light of this uncertainty, it is not surprising that bonds issued by 
T 2 | DANIEL GROS 
 
the European Financial Stability Facility (the eurozone’s rescue fund) are trading at a 
substantial premium over German debt. 
All variants of Eurobonds come with supposedly strong conditionality. Countries that 
want to use them must follow strict fiscal rules. But who guarantees that these rules 
will  actually  be  followed?  François  Hollande’s  victory  over  Sarkozy  in  France’s 
presidential election shows that an apparent consensus on the need for austerity can 
crumble  quickly.  What  recourse  do  creditor  countries  have  if  the  debtor  countries 
become the majority and decide to increase spending? 
The  recently  agreed  measures  to  strengthen  economic-policy  coordination  in  the 
eurozone (the so-called ‘six pack’) imply in principle that the European Commission 
should be the arbiter in such matters. Its recommendation can formally be overturned 
only by a two-thirds majority of the member states. But would a large member country 
feel bound by rulings from ‘unelected official in Brussels’? 
Spain’s experience is instructive in this respect. After the recent elections there, Prime 
Minister Mariano Rajoy’s new government announced that it did not feel bound by the 
adjustment programme agreed to by the previous administration. Rajoy was roundly 
rebuked for the form of his announcement, but its substance was proven right: Spain’s 
adjustment programme is now being made more lenient. 
The reality is thus that the larger member states are more equal than the smaller ones. 
This is of course not ‘fair’, but the inability of the EU to impose its view on democratic 
countries might actually sometimes be for the best, given that even the Commission is 
fallible. 
The broader message from the Greek and French elections is that the attempt to impose 
a benevolent dictatorship of the creditors is now being met by a revolt of the debtors. 
Financial markets have reacted as strongly as they have because investors recognise 
that the ‘sovereign’ in sovereign debt is an electorate that can simply decide not to pay. 
This scenario has already played out in the case of Greece, but the fate of the euro will 
be decided in the larger, systemically important countries like Italy and Spain. Only 
determined  action  by  their  governments,  supported  by  their  citizens,  showing  that 
they  attach  overriding  priority  to  their  membership  in  the  eurozone,  even  under 
difficult circumstances, and that they thus merit unreserved support from the rest of 
the eurozone, will impress the financial markets. At this point, nothing less can save 
the common currency. 